Indonesia's human rights commission has escalated pressure on the government to abandon mandatory military training for prospective managers enrolled in President Prabowo Subianto's signature Red and White Cooperatives programme, after five participants died during the initial stages of a 45-day training course. The deaths, occurring between June 17 and June 26, have triggered broader questions about the appropriateness of integrating military instruction into what is fundamentally an economic development initiative designed to tackle unemployment and accelerate growth across the archipelago.
The Red and White Cooperatives scheme, which commenced operations in July of the previous year, represents one of the administration's central pillars for inclusive economic development. The programme seeks to establish approximately 80,000 village cooperatives throughout Indonesia, with the explicit objective of generating employment opportunities and contributing to an ambitious national target of 8% economic growth by 2029. These cooperatives are structured to provide villagers with access to essential commodities, including subsidised cooking gas and fertiliser alongside other basic consumer goods, effectively serving as grassroots economic anchors in rural communities.
Nearly 35,000 individuals selected to lead these cooperative ventures have been required to complete military instruction as a prerequisite for their management roles. The training regimen, which commenced on June 14 and is scheduled to conclude on July 31, is being conducted across multiple regional military training installations nationwide. This requirement sits at the centre of a heated debate about whether such instruction aligns with cooperative management principles or represents an overextension of military authority into civilian economic institutions.
Pramono Ubaid Tantowi, a commissioner at the Indonesian Human Rights Commission, articulated the body's official position with clarity, recommending that authorities discontinue the military component of the manager development programme. His statement emphasised that cooperatives fundamentally operate as business entities with distinct organisational objectives—member service, economic sustainability, and effective governance—none of which logically depend upon military training methodologies. The commission's recommendation implicitly challenges the assumption that military discipline and procedures transfer meaningfully to cooperative administration and financial stewardship.
The defence ministry, assuming primary responsibility for implementing the training, initially characterised the deaths as attributable to diverse medical conditions rather than programme-related factors. Major General Ketut Gede Wetan, heading the ministry's human resources development division, disclosed that the five fatalities resulted from cardiac arrest, heat stroke, tuberculosis, and pneumonia across the affected individuals. According to his statement, all participants underwent mandatory medical screening prior to enrolment and received clearance to participate. The ministry further contended that the training curriculum emphasised neither combat techniques nor demanding physical exertion, thereby implicitly refuting suggestions that the rigour of the programme contributed to the tragic outcomes.
However, the defence ministry's reassurances have done little to satisfy public health and rights advocates concerned about the circumstances surrounding the deaths. The timing of the fatalities—concentrated within the opening fortnight of the 45-day programme—suggests potential inadequacies in medical oversight, heat management, or participant health assessment protocols. Even if the deaths resulted from pre-existing conditions, the question remains whether a military training environment, characterised by unfamiliar stress and heightened physical demands, adequately screened or accommodated individuals with underlying vulnerabilities.
In response to the criticism and loss of life, the defence ministry announced plans for comprehensive programme evaluation that would incorporate enhanced health monitoring mechanisms, improved early identification of at-risk participants, and modulation of activity intensity. The health ministry was subsequently incorporated into oversight responsibilities, signalling a belated acknowledgment that civilian health expertise should inform military training design. Nevertheless, critics argue these adjustments represent reactive damage control rather than a principled reconsideration of whether military instruction belongs in the cooperative development pathway.
Pramono articulated the human rights commission's preferred approach to cooperative manager development, advocating for curricula centred on managerial competency, modern leadership frameworks, and financial literacy instruction. These competencies directly address the actual operational challenges facing cooperative leaders—budgeting decisions, member accountability, market strategy, and organisational sustainability. Military training, he argued, bears no direct relationship to developing such capabilities and arguably diverts resources and attention from economically relevant skill-building.
The commission further demanded a comprehensive government investigation into the five deaths, calling upon law enforcement authorities to pursue forensic autopsy procedures that might establish definitive causes of death and determine whether criminal liability attaches to any party. This call for forensic evidence represents an implicit suggestion that the defence ministry's characterisation of the deaths as naturally occurring medical events may warrant independent verification. The request simultaneously signals that the rights body views the incident as potentially concerning enough to warrant criminal accountability frameworks, not merely administrative review.
The controversy surrounding the cooperative training initiative exemplifies broader questions about President Prabowo's governance approach since assuming office in 2024. As a retired general, Prabowo has consistently expanded military institutional roles within civilian policy domains, a pattern evident across multiple flagship development programmes. This expansion of military authority into economic and social administration reflects a particular conception of governance that emphasises hierarchy, discipline, and military-style organisation as solutions to development challenges. Yet the cooperative programme deaths illustrate the potential human costs of this approach when military methodologies are applied to contexts where civilian expertise and values might prove more appropriate.
The incident also carries significant implications for Indonesia's broader development trajectory and international standing. International development organisations and bilateral partners increasingly scrutinise governance quality and institutional accountability as prerequisites for development assistance and investment. A programme resulting in preventable deaths during its foundational phase risks damaging confidence in the administration's capacity to manage large-scale economic initiatives responsibly. Southeast Asian investors and development partners will be monitoring whether the government accepts accountability for the deaths or maintains a defensive posture that prioritises institutional reputation over transparent investigation.
Looking forward, the government faces a critical choice regarding the cooperative programme's structure and the role of military institutions within it. Accepting the human rights commission's recommendations would signal responsiveness to institutional oversight and acknowledgment that civilian expertise should guide civilian economic development initiatives. Alternatively, maintaining the military training requirement despite the deaths would reinforce perceptions that the administration prioritises military institutional expansion over programme effectiveness and participant safety. The coming weeks will clarify whether the cooperative initiative emerges as a cautionary example of misaligned institutional approaches or as a reformed programme genuinely responsive to demonstrated risks.
