Germany is undergoing a profound reassessment of its relationship with China, emerging as Europe's most skeptical nation towards Beijing as economic hardship forces a recalibration of longstanding trade policies. A comprehensive survey across thirteen European countries reveals that nearly half of German respondents—49 per cent—perceive China as primarily a rival or adversary, a figure substantially higher than France's 43 per cent and suggesting that public opinion may finally support a tougher diplomatic and commercial stance that Berlin has historically resisted.
The shift reflects tangible economic suffering within Germany's heartland. The European Council on Foreign Relations, a leading policy research organization, documents that Germany's manufacturing sector has haemorrhaged around 420,000 jobs between 2019 and 2025, with the bleeding continuing at approximately 10,000 positions monthly. This sustained employment crisis distinguishes Germany from its peers and helps explain the hardening public attitude. The automotive industry, long the cornerstone of German industrial prowess and export competitiveness, faces particular pressure as Chinese competitors expand their footprint both domestically and internationally, crowding out traditional German manufacturers in markets that once appeared secure.
Yet Germany's political leadership has remained notably cautious, hesitant to embrace the confrontational posture that other European capitals have tentatively adopted. During 2024, Berlin notably abstained from supporting European Union anti-subsidy duties on Chinese-made electric vehicles, positioning itself as an outlier within the bloc of twenty-seven member states. This reluctance reflects deep divisions within Chancellor Friedrich Merz's coalition government, where Economy Minister Katherina Reiche, herself a member of Merz's Christian Democratic Union, has emerged as the most resistant voice against what observers are terming a "China shock 2.0."
The political dynamics appear favorable for a policy reversal, however. The think tank's findings suggest that mainstream German voters would not punish their representatives for pursuing a more assertive China strategy. Among supporters of the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party—the two dominant centrist and centre-left forces—roughly 60 per cent describe China as either a rival or an adversary. This alignment between public sentiment and potential government action removes a significant political obstacle to recalibrating relations. Importantly, only 38 per cent of Germans maintain positive views of China as a partner or ally, a stark contrast to populations in Spain and Bulgaria where 65 and 62 per cent respectively hold favorable assessments.
An intriguing political dimension complicates this narrative. Germany's more extreme parties—the far-right Alternative for Germany, which leads numerous current polling aggregates, and the leftist Die Linke—demonstrate notably warmer attitudes towards Beijing. The Alternative for Germany presents the most positive profile, with 45 per cent characterizing China as a necessary partner and only 31 per cent viewing it as a rival. This pattern inverts typical ideological assumptions, as one might expect right-leaning movements to adopt protectionist positions. The finding underscores how China policy cuts across conventional political cleavages in ways that traditional left-right frameworks inadequately capture.
Perhaps most remarkably, the Social Democrats—traditionally the European party family most inclined towards diplomatic engagement and trade openness with Beijing—now rank among Germany's most hawkish factions on China. Sixty per cent of Social Democratic voters regard China as a rival or adversary, positioning them ahead of the national average and challenging the assumption that left-leaning voters necessarily favor accommodation. This reversal suggests that material economic interests and employment concerns transcend ideological commitments when livelihoods face direct threat.
Significant cracks in the united front that German business has historically presented to policymakers further indicate changing circumstances. The chief executive of Volkswagen, one of Germany's industrial trinity alongside BMW and Mercedes-Benz, recently told investors that the European Commission should impose tariffs on Chinese plug-in hybrid electric vehicles while simultaneously praising the very duty measures he had strenuously opposed merely months earlier. Noah Barkin, an analyst specializing in German-China relations at Rhodium Group, observed that this intervention marked unprecedented terrain: "It was the first time that the head of one of Germany's big three carmakers had called publicly for trade defence measures against China."
This rupture in the traditional stance of German industry reflects a stark reorientation of calculations. For decades, the dominant strategy pursued by Berlin's largest corporations and their political allies was straightforward—lobby the German government and European Commission to avoid any measures that might upset Chinese trade relationships. That consensus proved remarkably durable even as Chinese competitors systematically expanded market share and German employment contracted. The sustainability of this approach has now evaporated as competitive threats have intensified beyond the point where business-as-usual lobbying offers any meaningful protection.
The implications for Southeast Asia and the broader region warrant careful consideration. Malaysia, as a significant trading partner positioned within global supply chains, could experience consequences from any fundamental reorientation of German and European China policy. A more protectionist European stance might reshape investment flows, technology transfer arrangements, and market access patterns that many Malaysian firms depend upon. Additionally, as Germany and Europe reassess relationships with Beijing, the regional balance of power and diplomatic alignments within ASEAN could shift in subtle but consequential ways.
The emerging German consensus reflects economic reality more than geopolitical ideology. When manufacturing capabilities erode and employment evaporates despite policy stability, political change becomes inevitable. Berlin's apparent movement towards accepting trade measures against China represents not a sudden ideological conversion but rather a belated recognition that protecting domestic interests sometimes requires accepting uncomfortable costs elsewhere. Whether this shift translates into formal policy changes remains uncertain given internal coalition divisions, but the public permission structure for such changes has clearly materialized, removing one major impediment to a strategic recalibration that seemed politically impossible merely two years ago.
